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1
SECOND CAUSE IN POSTERIOR ANALYTICS II. 11
In his commentary on Posterior Analytics II. 11 Ross maintains 
that Aristotle substitutes for material cause a new cause 
representing "necessitating conditions", modeled on the definition 
of the syllogism in Prior Analytics I.24bl8-20. Ross's view is 
generally accepted by contemporary translators and commentators.
I contend that the second cause of Posterior Analytics II. 11 
expresses Aristotle's doctrine of material cause as hypothetical 
necessity in Physics II.
Ross insists the second cause is not material cause, because 
the notion of constituent material is absent, and Aristotle illus­
trates the cause's role as syllogistic middle term through a mathe­
matical example. Instead of translating Aristotle's words for the 
second cause, "to tinon onton ananke tout· einai·· (94a21-2) , Ross 
engages in the following rationale:
"This pretty clearly refers to the definition of syllogism as 
given in An· Pr. 24bl8-20 and the reference to a syllogism is made 
explicit in 94a24-7. He clearly is referring to the relation of 
ground to consequent. The ground of the conclusion of a syllogism 
is the two premises taken together, but in order to make his 
account of this sort of aition fit into his general formula that 
the ait ion functions as the middle term in the proof of that whose 
aition it is, he represents this aition as being the middle term —  
the middle term, we must understand, as related in a certain way to 
the major and in a certain way to the minor.”
In order to make the words of the first formula mean- "neces­
sitating conditions", Ross takes "tinon onton" to be equivalent to 
"tëthenton tinon" of the definition of the syllogism [Logos en ho 
tethenton tinon heteron ti ton keimenon ex anankes sumbainei to 
tauta einai]. Thus they mean, "When certain things exist", and 
stand for syllogistic premises, while the demonstrative todi' 
stands for the syllogistic conclusion: "When certain things (the
premises) exist, it is necessary that this thing (the conclusion) 
exists." On Ross's interpretation the second cause, signified by 
"tinon onton", then stands for "necessitating conditions" or 
"logical ground for a consequent".
However, Aristotle presents two formulations of the second 
cause in Posterior Analytics II. 11, which he "clearly" means to be 
equivalent. These two formulations of the second cause, taken 
literally without reference to the definition of the syllogism, fit 
Aristotle's description of a material cause being "hypothetical 
necessity" in Physics II - that is, a necessary means to produce 
a goal. In Physics II.9 Aristotle's thesis that an elementary 
mathematical definition is a "hypothetical necessity" for the proof 
of a mathematical theorem explains the application of the second 
cause as middle term in the mathematical syllogism of Posterior 
Analytics II.11.
1. Second Cause in Posterior Analytics II. 11 and Material Cause
in Physics II.
2In Posterior Analytics II.11 Aristotle maintains all four 
causes may serve as middle term in a syllogistic demonstration 
(94a20ff.)· The first, third and fourth are readily identified as 
formal, efficient and final cause; by the process of elimination 
the second should be the material cause. Ross's rendering of 
"logical ground of a consequent" or "necessitating conditions" are 
highly abstract translations of Aristotle's concrete words for the 
second cause. Although Tredennick says Aristotle's first 
formulation, "to tinon onton ananke tout' einai" is "barely repro­
ducible in English" , its literal sense would be, "of (for) some 
kinds of beings it is a necessity that this thing exist". Here 
(without syllogism parallel) "tinon onton" is simply a genitive 
noun with adjective, "of some kinds of beings". The demonstrative 
"this thing" (tout') names the second cause and "tinoñ onton" 
specific beings for which its existence is a necessity.
The immediately following sentence contains a second formu­
lation of the second cause which confirms this meaning: 'To hou 
ontos todi' ananke einai" (94a24). Literally, "of whose being this 
thing is a necessity". This formula is ignored by Ross and commen­
tators following his authority, but its meaning is crucial for a 
correct understanding of the second cause. In my last section I 
shall argue that this second formula undermines Ross's correlation 
of the second cause with the definition of the syllogism. For the 
present I leave Ross's argument and its philosophical motivations 
aside.
In Physics II Aristotle first describes a material cause in 
the most familiar way as that out of which a thing is constituted 
and which persists in its final form (194b23-5), using familiar 
examples such as the bronze of a statue. However in chapter 7 
Aristotle provides another listing of causes in which his descrip­
tion of the material cause differs markedly. Since Aristotle uses 
the very same example of a syllogism's premises being matter for 
its conclusion that he does earlier in chapter 3 (195al8-20) he 
evidently sees no conflict between these two descriptions of 
material cause.
In listing causes operative in the reproduction of a species 
instance, Aristotle describes the material cause in these words: 
"that this must be so if that is to be so (as the conclusion 
presupposes the premises)" (198b7-8). Aristotle's Greek is "ei 
mellei todi' esesthai." Literally, "If (something) is to come to 
pass, this thing will have to be". The Physics II.7 formula for 
material cause, like the two formulations of second cause in 
APo.II.ll. as I interpret them literally, makes the material cause 
a necessity for the existence of something else. The material 
cause is indicated in each by a demonstrative pronoun (todi', 
tout) . Although the word "necessity" does not occur in the Phvs. 
II.7 definition, the same weight is carried by the verb, esesthai, 
"will have to be".
In Parts of Animals 1.1 Aristotle describes hypothetical 
necessity in terms similar to the Phvs. II.7 definition of material 
cause: "Necessity signifies sometimes that if there is to be that
3for the sake of which, these things must necessarily be present” 
(642a32). Here as in the other three cases the cause that is the 
hypothetical necessity is signified by a demonstrative, while the 
first noun represents the goal it serves.
Thus the second cause of Posterior Analytics II.11 has a 
history in Aristotle's doctrine of hypothetical necessity in 
Physics II. Since there is general agreement that the Analytics 
were written ca. 341, a few years after Physics II, ca. 347-4, 
agreement between the two works is not surprising.
2. Simple and Hypothetical Necessity in Physics II.
At the close of Physics II Aristotle establishes a connection 
between his own material cause and the factor of necessity 
prominent in his predecessors' natural science when he identifies 
necessity in nature with "matter and its changes" (200a30-32). 
Aristotle does not mention "hypothetical necessity" until the last 
chapter of Phvs. II.9 (199b34-5), but he already is using the
notion in previous chapters, in particular in the definition of 
material cause in Phvs. II.7. He opens chapter 9 questioning 
whether there is both hypothetical and simple necessity in nature. 
He defines hypothetical necessity in terms of the necessity of 
suitable matter for the fulfillment of an end (200a7-15). But he 
is not so explicit about "simple" necessity.
In chapters 7 and 8, however, he has complained that the 
ancients (principally Empedocles and Anaxagoras) appealed only to 
necessity in accounting for the causes of natural phenomena, 
notwithstanding their lip-service to non-material causes such as 
mind, love and hate (198bl4-16). Cooper suggests Aristotle objects 
only to their overuse of "simple" necessity, and accepts the 
presence in nature of "simple" necessity.
In common with his ancient predecessors, Aristotle sees 
necessity in the activity of the material elements, fire, earth, 
air and water (195al7-18, 198bl2-14)—  their transformations into 
each other, characteristic alterations and directions of movement. 
The four basic material elements act mechanically in heating and 
cooling, condensation and rarefaction, etc. Their behavior depends 
only on an element's present or antecedent state, and is not 
affected by a future state, such as a goal to be realized. Simple 
necessity for Aristotle appears to stand for the mechanical 
activity of the basic material elements, acting on their own, di­
vorced from any purposiveness. When material elements are combined 
in the form of a living being, however, their independent activity 
is constrained as welj. as utilized by the form's structure and 
purposive functioning.
In goal-directed natural processes such as the generation of 
» a species instance substantial form comprises not only formal and
final cause, but even efficient cause, for "man generates man" 
( 198a26—7) . The causes of such physical processes are consequently 
• form, on the one hand, and matter, representing necessity, on the
other (198a24-6). Whenever a sequence of material changes always or 
for the most part leads continuously to a distinctive culmination.
4such as the process from acórn to oak, the successive states of 
matter are all heneka tou, means toward an ulterior goal, so in­
stances of hypothetical necessity in nature (l98a33-5). Since 
Aristotle dichotomizes the four causes into matter on the one hand, 
and form (containing efficient and final causes) on the other (199- 
a8-ll), each earlier stage of an organism provides the material 
conditions (hypothetical necessity) for the next step, until the 
form is completely instantiated in a particular individual. He 
defines nature as comprising beings which move continually starting 
from a seed produced by an existing adult until the species form of 
•that adult is again embodied (199bl5-18).
Necessity in nature includes the presence of the kind of seed 
or acorn needed to initiate the generative process (199b7-9). Such 
necessity is also hypothetical, required by the presence in nature 
of a form destined to be embodied in a new individual, Aristotle 
asserts in Physics II.9 (200al9-20) . In an analogy between natural 
and craft productions at the beginning of the book * s final chapter, 
Aristotle fixes a limited role for matter through its being 
hypothetical necessity; the presence of suitable matter, although 
required, does not account for the goal that requires and directs 
the powers of matter (200a5-15).
3. Mathematical Necessity and Hypothetical Necessity in Physics 
II.9.
In Physics II.7 Aristotle opens a discussion of proximate 
causes with mathematics, which deals with unmoving things, in 
contrast to the moving things of nature. In mathematics the proxi­
mate cause is assignable to definitions of elementary notions such 
as "right angle” or "Commensurable", while in the case of moving 
things, the proximate cause is matter (198al5-18.). Here Aristotle 
parallels proximate cause in mathematics (definitions of elementary 
notions) with material cause in generated substances.
After describing the role of material cause in natural and 
artificial productions as hypothetical necessity, Aristotle makes 
a comparison between necessity in nature and in mathematics in 
Physics II.9. He illustrates necessity in mathematics by the role 
of elementary mathematical definitions in mathematical proof. Is 
this necessity hypothetical, or does the def inition "necessitate", 
as Ross says?1
Since this is an essential point of my argument, I shall cite 
the whole passage together with its prelude. Here is my 
translation of the prelude which connects matter with hypothetical 
necessity:
"Similarly, in all other cases in which there is a goal/final 
cause, tlyp goal cannot exist without things possessing natural 
necessity , but nevertheless the end does not exist on account of 
these necessities but for a purpose. For example why is the saw 
such a kind of a thing? in order to be this thing and for the sake 
of this purpose. However this purpose cannot be fulfilled unless 
it is of iron; it is necessary that it be iron, if it is to be a 
saw and pérform its proper work. The necessity derives from that
5hypothésis, but is not in the goal. For necessity is in the 
matter, that for the sake of which there is a necessity is in the 
account” (200a5-15)
This prelude indicates that a hypothetical necessity, like 
that of iron for a saw and acorn for oak, is a necessary means to 
a goal, but does not "necessitate" that end: rather, the ground of
the end is "in the account". If the elementary mathematical 
definition is also a hypothetical necessity for the goal of the 
theorem*s proof, the elementary definition does not account for or 
"necessitate" a mathematical theorem it goes to prove. The 
following passage indicates the elementary mathematical definition 
is such a hypothetical necessity:
"The necessity in mathematics and genesis in accordance with 
nature are in a certain way comparable. For since the straight 
line is this particular thing, it is necessary that the triangle 
has angles equal to two right angles. But it is not the case that 
because the latter (the triangle has angles equal to two right 
angles), the former (the definition of straight line). However, if 
the theorem is not, neither is the definition of straight line. In 
generation for the sake of an end, it is the other way round, if 
the end will be or is, also that which precedes it will be or is. 
If not, just as there not being the conclusion, the starting point 
will not be, so is it here with the end and purpose...so that if 
there is a house, it is necessary for certain things to become or 
already exist, or generally the matter that is means for the end, 
for example, brick or stone, if a house. Not however on account of 
these things (brick and stone) is there the end, except as its 
matter; neither will the end exist on account of the means (brick 
and stone). Generally however if the means do not exist neither 
will there be house or saw, in the one case there not being stones, 
in the other no iron. Neither here (in mathematics) are there 
starting points (elementary definitions) if the triangle does not 
have two right angles" (200al5-30).
In the latter part of the passage (200a25-30) Aristotle 
parallels elementary mathematical definitions (archai) with the 
necessary material means of stones for a house and iron for a saw. 
As in the prelude Aristotle asserts these means are necessary for 
but do not necessitate the ends they make possible. He adds at the 
end that the absence of an end or the falsity of a mathematical 
theorem implies that its necessary means do not exist. If a 
mathematical theorem is false, then the necessary starting point 
for its proof, the definition of a suitable elementary mathematical 
notion, is not available. Consequently for Aristotle, the starting 
points for mathematical proof are elementary mathematical 
definitions such as those for straight line, right angle and 
commensurable —  they constitute hypothetical necessity for the 
truth of a theorem, comparable to stones for a house and iron for 
a saw.
If Aristotle considers the elementary mathematical definition 
a hypothetical necessity in mathematical proof, what is the meaning 
of "since the straight line is this particular thing, it is neces-
6sary that the triangle has angles equal to two right angles” 
(200al7-18)? It cannot mean that the definition of straight line 
by itself necessitates the truth of the theorem. Like the stones 
of the house or the iron of the saw, the definition is only a 
necessity for the. theorem*s truth, one premise of the mathematical 
syllogism that constitutes its demonstration. Aristotle clarifies 
this point in APo.II.11, when he remarks that a second premise is 
needed to produce a conclusion even when the middle term is a cause 
that is a necessity for it (94a24-26) . The requirement of a second 
premise shows the definitional premise alone does not necessitate 
the„conclusion.
After pointing out the similarity between necessity in nature 
and mathematics in that their goals involve hypothetical necessity, 
the early part of the passage goes on to point out a difference. 
In mathématics priority lies in the starting points and necessary 
means, the elementary definitions. Their truth does not depend 
upon theorems for which they are hypothetical necessity; the 
theorem does not substantiate the elementary notion (200al8). In 
their independence elementary mathematical definitions are 
comparable,to material elements, like them having their own "natu­
ral necessity”, apart from higher level beings they compose. In 
natural, generation the case is "the other way round" : the adult
form ofl oak generates its own material starting point, the acorn, 
and "men generates man". Thus the goal of natural genesis, unlike 
the theorem of mathematics, brings into existence its own material 
starting point, showing the primacy of form over matter/necessity 
in nature.
Ross misses the point that an elementary mathematical defini­
tion is hypothetical necessity for a theorem's proof, like th^ 
necessary material means in the genesis of a species instance. 
He sees only a comparison between mathematical and natural 
necessity in each being "one-sided": the elementary definition
necessitating the theorem, but not vice-versa; the adult form 
necessitating the material means, but not vice-versa. If, however, 
the mathematical definition necessitated the theorem, instead of 
being a necessity for its proof, it would make no sense for 
Aristotle to sandwich his talk of mathematical necessity between 
discussions of hypothetical necessity, as he does, and to parallel 
elementary mathematical notions with necessary material means.
Aristotle*s final point stresses a second resemblance between 
necessity in mathematics and necessity in natural or artificial 
production, which reinforces thé parallel between elementary 
mathematica1 notions and material means. If the mathematical 
theorem about the triangle * s angle sum has no proof, then there is 
not the elementary definition (of straight line) necessary to its 
proof. This conditional foreshadows the latter passage in which 
the nonexistence of house or saw and falsity of goal/theorem are 
attributed to the absence of each^ne's hypothetical necessity, 
material means or starting points. Aristotle*s point that the 
failure of a goal to be realized implies that its necessary means 
do not exist stresses again the role of hypothetical necessity as 
means necessary for an end.
74. Hypothetical Necessity and Material Cause in Posterior Analytics
11.11.
Aristotle*s illustration of hypothetical necessity by an 
elementary mathematical definition in Phvs. II.9 is the key to the 
mathematical illustration of the second cause in APo. II.11. In 
the latter, the definition of right angle illustrates the second 
cause, which he names middle term in a syllogism whose conclusion 
is that the angle inscribed in a semicircle is a right angle. He 
names the terms as follows;
Major term A - right angle; middle term B = half of two right 
angles; minor term C = angle in the semicircle.
The crucial passage, which Ross ignores and does not trans­
late, comes in the question, "of what being is the right angle?” 
(94a28). This question signals the definition of a right angle: 
"half of two right angles". Thus the mathematical syllogism goes 
in Aristotle's terms:
B =. A (elementary definition of right angle); C = B; there­
fore, C = A.
The minor premise needed to complete the syllogism, that the 
angle in a semicircle is equal to half of two right angles, is 
derived from prior mathematical reasoning and probably exhibited in 
a diagram (Met. 1051a23-9).
In the earlier mathematical example of Phvs. II.9 Aristotle 
does not formulate the mathematical syllogism or name its terms as 
he does in APo. II.11, but he refers to a syllogistic conclusion 
(199b21) (that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles) and 
refers to the definition of straight line without giving it. Ross 
explains that the definition of straight line in luciid implies the 
property of having angles equal ty5 two right angles when "one 
straight line stands on another." . One can reconstruct the 
syllogism, inserting the two premises, in analogy with that of APo.
11.11, as follows:
Major term A = equal to two right angles; middle term B = 
straight line's angle sum; minor term Ç = angle sum of a triangle? 
The mathematical syllogism goes
B = A (elementary definition of straight line), C - B; there^ 
fore, C = A.
Again the other premise that a triangle's angles are equal to 
those around a straight line is derived from prior mathematical 
reasoning and/or exhibited in a diagram·
Thus the causal middle term of APo. II. 11 and the hypothetical 
necessity of Phvs. II.9, both elementary mathematical definitions, 
play an identical role as middle term in syllogistic proof of a 
mathematical theorem. The two mathematical passages complement 
each other in explaining the necessary role of the definition of an 
elementary mathematical notion in the syllogism that constitutes 
? demonstration of a mathematical theorem. One must note the
significance of Aristotle's question, "Of what being is a right 
angle?" in APo. II.11, in order to connect the second cause of APo. 
fc II.11 with the elementary mathematical definition being proximate
cause in Phvs. 11,7 and hypothetical necessity in the mathematical 
syllogism of Phvs. II.9.
8At the end of the mathematical demonstration in APo II.ll 
Aristotle says baldly "and this thing (the second cause) is the 
same as the formal cause (To ti en einai)" (94b34), an identifi­
cation troubling to many. Tredennick, following Ross, maintains 
the material cause "inappropriate for the present purpose", a 
mathematical demonstration, and protests "the material cause cannot 
be equated with the formal cause". Since Aristotle speaks of an 
elementary mathematical definition as "ti esti" cause (Phvs. 
198al6-18) one can understand how he thinks of it also as a formal 
cause, even though its being hypothetical necessity associates it 
with material cause.
Although Aristotle’s claim that elementary mathematical 
definitions correspond to material cause seems bizarre. Metaphysics 
K raises the issue of what science handles difficulties about the 
matter of the objects of mathematics (1059bl5ff). Since straight 
line and right angle, for example, are necessary components of a 
geometrical figure, much as bricks are components of a house, they 
may correspond to material cause. The final sentences in Phvs.II. 
9 speak of a factor of necessity in a definition such that some 
parts are like the "matter in the definition" (200b4-8) . Thus a 
unity of formal and material cause in mathematical demonstration is 
not far-fetched for Aristotle.
Aristotle concludes APo. II.11 with a discussion of simple 
necessity, first asserting the possible coincidence of necessity 
and final cause as dual explanations of the same thing (94b27-37). 
Here?the identity of the factor of necessity with Aristotle’s more 
familiar material cause is undeniable: In Phvs. II.3 (195al7-18)
fire and the other material elements are cited as instances of 
material cause; similarly in APo. II.11 he illustrates necessity 
through phenomena of the basic material elements. Necessity ac­
counts for the firelight emanating from the pores of the lantern 
(material cause), which thereby lights the traveler's path (final 
cause); the occurrence of thunder produced by the extinction of 
fire in the clouds (material cause) serves to frighten sinners in 
Tartarus on the Pythagorean view (final cause).
He makes a new distinction between the simple necessity of 
Phvs. II, in which a thing acts in accords with its natural 
impulse, and a necessity which compels a thing to act contrary to 
it, as when a stone is thrown upward (94b37-95a2). He alludes to 
Phvs. Il*s subordination of hypothetical necessity to formal/final 
cause in his insistence that works of mind such as a house or 
statue only come into being through a final cause never merely 
through (simple) necessity. Far from being absent from the chap­
ter, Aristotle's classic material cause appears in the guise of 
necessity, both simple and hypothetical.
5.Ross's Rejection of Material Cause in Posterior Analytics II.11.
I shall complete my argument by questioning Ross's derivation 
of "necessitating conditions" for the second cause via the defini­
tion of the syllogism. The definition of the syllogism is a 
complex grammatical statement of 15 words, "Logos en ho tethenton
9complex grammatical statement of 15 words, "Logos en ho tethenton 
tinon heteron ti ton keimenon ex anankes sumbainei to taut a einai". 
("A syllogism is a form of words in which when certain assumptions 
are made, something other than what has been assumed necessarily 
follows from the fact that the assumptions are such”). The 
second cause is described in two short phrases. The first, the 
only one noted by Ross, reads, "To tinon onton ananke tout* einai". 
Ross's translation depends on paralleling this phrase with the 
definition of the syllogism to make tinon onton into a genitive 
absolute so that it means "When certain things exist". The text 
itself does not make any such parallel. Aristotle's second 
formulation of the second cause in the immediately following 
sentence, however, bears no resemblance to the definition of the 
syllogism except for one common word "necessity". Ross neglects 
these words: nhou ontos todi* ananke einai" (94a24). But this
second formulation ought to be considered when the meaning of the 
second cause is in question, for clearly Aristotle supposes his two 
formulations of the second cause are equivalent. If the second 
does not mean "necessitating conditions", neither does the first.
In the second formula the genitive plural "tinon onton", which 
Ross identifies with syllogistic premises, is replaced by the 
singular "hou ontos", a genitive noun and possessive, "the being of 
which". This switch undermines Ross's interpretation, for one 
cannot turn the latter into "when certain things exist" for a 
syllogistic parallel by any grammatical stratagem. Ross requires 
a plural to correspond to the syllogism's two "necessitating" 
premises, whereas the second formula only contains two singulars, 
one for the necessity and one for that of which it is necessity.
Aristotle's indifferent use of singular or plural for the 
first noun of the second cause formula is readily explained if the 
genitive noun indicates a kind of thing for which the second cause, 
the demonstrative, is a necessity. A literal translation of the 
second formula, "for whose being this thing is a necessity", 
implies the cause is Aristotle's "hypothetical necessity", a 
necessary means to a goal named by the first noun. The whole 
sentence containing the second description of the second cause 
holds that this kind of cause cannot be inferred from one premise 
only. Ross translates: "For... the conditions that necessitate a
consequent must be at least two, linked by a single middle term." 
Aristotle's own words contain no plural for Ross's "conditions that 
necessitate a consequent". If one translates literally, the sen­
tence says, "that of whose being this thing is a necessity, there 
is no (conclusion) taking one premise only, two are the least 
number; this is the case whenever they have one middle term" 
(94a24-26).
Ross supposes Aristotle's reference here to the syllogism con­
firms his linking of the second cause with the definition of the 
syllogism. Aristotle's cautionary remark is apt, however, when a 
material cause/hypothetical necessity is middle term. For we 
readily leap between the presence of a thing and its necessary 
means - syllable and letters; saw and iron, etc. In contrast
6
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efficient cause and final cause are usually separable from what 
they effect. By underlining the necessity of a second premise, 
Aristotle implies that the second cause by itself does not 
necessitate the syllogistic conclusion,. pace Ross.
Ross's application of the second cause standing for an 
"eternal ground" in Aristotle's mathematical example is not a 
success even in his own eyes. He first says it can be understood 
from Meta. 104la27-30 and Meta.1051a27. The former stresses that 
the formal cause (to ti en einai) is the prime explanation for an 
attribute belonging to a subject. In the latter Aristotle explains 
that the proof of a mathëmatical theorem, mentioning the very two 
used as examples in Ago. II. 11 and Phvs. II.9, is apparent to one 
who perceives how it iá exhibited in a geometrical construction. 
Ross does not connect these passages with the "¿terna1 ground" he 
supposes to operate in Aristotle's mathematical example.
Ross argues that in any syllogism a middle term, whatever its 
referent, necessitates the conclusion because of its logical 
relationship with end terms established in the two premises. 
However the second cause middle term, because of its actual 
referent, enables one to recognize how it necessitates the conclu­
sion. Although Ross surmises that Aristotle substitutes "eternal 
ground" because a matèrial cause cannot be employed as middle term 
in a mathematical syllogism, he expresses dissatisfaction with its 
mathematical illustration in Ago II.11:
"In this argument NQP's being the half of two right angles is 
the ground of its being one right angle, or rather the causa 
coqnoscendi of this.. .But Aristotle's comment 'this, the ground, is 
the same as the essencë of thé attribute demonstrated, because this 
is what its definition points to' (a34-5j is a puzzling statement. 
Reasoning by analogy (it would appear)...A. seems to contemplate 
some such definition of the rightness of the angle in the 
semicircle as 'its being right in consequence of being the half of 
two right a n g l e s a n d  for this little can be said. The analogy 
between the efficient cause of an event and the causa coqnoscendi 
of an eternal consequent breaks down; the one can fairly be 
included in the definition of the event, the other cannot be 
included in the definition of the consequent."
Barnes rejects Ross's epistemological version of the second 
cause which makes it the caus^ of our knowing that the middle term 
necessitates the conclusion. Instead Barnes concedes that the 
second cause is an "uncanohic" form of material cause, whose 
material content somehow necessitates the conclusion. Both Barnes 
and Ross overlook Aristotle's caveat that the second cause like any 
other middle term, requires a second premise in order to generate 
a conclusion. If the second cause middle term of itself necessi­
tated the conclusion, there would be no need for a second premise 
or a syllogism.
In Ross's analysis the "consequent" is the conclusion that the 
angle in the semicircle is a right angle, while its "eternal 
ground" is Aristotle^s middle term B, half of two right angles. 
Ross's application of Aristotle's words about the second cause 
being the same as the formal cause runs into trouble because he
11
supposes them to mean that the "eternal ground”, half of two right 
angles" is an element of the "consequent", the whole conclusion 
that the angle in the semicircle is right. Ross's analysis is 
faulty: 2Q What Aristotle does, following Euclid as Ross duly 
reports,20 is to define the right angle itself as half of two right 
angles. This is an elementary mathematical definition, which 
serves as hypothetical necessity according to Phvs. II.9, and is 
one premise of the mathematical syllogism. This definition of 
right angle shows that the angle in the semicircle is right, 
because the angle in the semicircle is half of two right angles, as 
the accompanying geometrical construction would show, and as the 
second premise holds.
The inability of Ross to explain how Aristotle's mathematical 
illustration works out proves the bankruptcy of his view that the 
second cause represents "necessitating conditions" or "eternal 
ground of a consequent", or the cause of our knowing such. On the 
other hand, if the second cause of APo. II.11 is the hypothetical 
necessity of Physics II.9, both works are coherent in showing the 
mathematical application of Aristotle's definition of material 
cause in Physics II.7. It is not surprising Aristotle emphasizes 
the factor of necessity rather than material constituent in his 
descriptions of the second cause in APo. II.11, since its greater 
inclusiveness covers demonstrations of mathematics as well as 
physics.
The novelty of Aristotle's actual words for the second cause 
is not the only reason for Ross's rejection of material cause in 
APo. II.11. Ross promulgates the thesis that matter, being a 
metaphysical notion, unknowable in itself, plays no part in thé 
Analytics. Defending the view that Aristotle "is not putting 
forward his usual four causes", Ross speculates "this chapter 
belongs to an early stage at which he had not reached the doctrine 
of the four causes." Yet there is common agreement among scholars 
that Physics II, where Aristotle presents a full exposition of the 
four causes, was completed several years before Aristotle undertook 
the Analytics. Among all the works of Aristotle Rist claims 
Analytics virtually the only one written consecutively from 
beginning to end, so we cannot simpóse the Posterior Analytics 
chapter written before Physics II.
Ross's second ground for denying the presence of material 
cause is the questionable metaphysical status of matter: "...both
the word hyle and the notion for which it stands are entirely 
absent from the Organon. It could hardly be Otherwise; hyle is 
agnostos kath'auten (Met. 1036a9); it does not occur as a term in 
any of our ordinary judgments (as apart from metaphysical 
judgments) and it is with judgments and the inferences that include 
them that logic is concerned."
However, the bewildering metaphysical conception of matter 
treated in Metaphysics differs from the common-sensical notion of 
a material cause, which Aristotle maintains the science of physics 
must study in Physics II. The ancient commentators had no trouble 
identifying the second cause with Aristotle's material cause.
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Ross does not point to any other place where Aristotle invokes the 
syllogistic-type cause. It is unlikely Aristotle would introduce 
a remarkable new cause, then drop it entirely. In contrast the 
notion of hypothetical necessity is a fundamental principle of 
Aristotle's biology. I conclude that Aristotle's second cause in 
APo. II. 11 expresses Aristotle's material cause/hypothetical neces­
sity, not some "uncanonical" material cause, "eternal ground", 
."logical ground of a conseguent" or "necessitating conditions".
ENDNOTES
l.W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1949, 637-642. Unless otherwise specified Analytics 
translations are drawn from this work.
2.For example: Aristotle Prior and Posterior Analytics. edited and
translated by John Warrington. London: Everyman, 1964, 250.
Posterior Analytics. translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge: 
Harvard, 1960, 208-9, n.e. Russell Dancy, "On some of Aristotle's 
Second Thoughts about Substances: Matter", The Philosophical
Review. 87, #3 (July, 1978) , 372-413. John M. Rist, The Mind of 
Aristotle: A Study in Philosophical Growth. Toronto: Toronto,
1989, 264. Daniel W. Graham, Aristotle's Two Systems. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1987, 157. Aristotle Posterior Analytics, translation 
and commentary by Jonathan Barnes, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994, 
59.
3.Ross, 1949, 638.
4. "A syllogism is a form of words in which when certain assumptions 
are made, something other than what has been assumed necessarily 
follows from the fact that the assumptions are such". H. Tredenn­
ick, Aristotle Prior Analytics. Cambridge: Harvard, 1960, 201.
5.Tredennick, 1960, 209, n. e.
6.Rist, 1989, 83. Ross, 1936, 7 places the writing of Phvs. II ca. 
347-4, in agreement with Rist.
13
7.For hypothetical necessity in Aristotle's biology see John M. 
Cooper, "Hypothetical Necessity", Aristotle on Nature and Living 
Beings , ed. Allan Gotthelf. Pittsburgh, Mathesis, 152-167. 
According to Cooper, 153 "Aristotle's conception of hypothetical 
necessity ... unites two at first sight divergent ideas: the idea
of matter as making some outcomes or arrangements necessary, and 
the idea of those outcomes and arrangements as nonetheless means to 
a natural goal."
8. Cooper, 1985, 156-61.
9. See Mary Louise Gill, Aristotle on Substance. Princeton: 
Princeton, 1989, chs. 2 and 5 for the role of material elements.
10.W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics. Oxford: Clarendon, 1936, 531-2.
11.By things that have a necessary nature Cooper says "Aristotle 
means things that by a necessity of their nature act and react in 
certain ways", that is, simple necessity. Cooper, 1985, 160.
12. Ross, 1936, 531-33.
13. Ross, 1949, 639 supposes this passage to refer to the relation­
ship between any syllogism's premises and conclusion, but the text 
shows Aristotle speaking only of a mathematical syllogism and its 
definitional premise.
14.Ross, 1949, 641-2. Barnes, 1994, 59, 227 translates the
question but ridicules Aristotle's definition, which Ross traces in 
Euclid.
15. Ross, 1936, 532.
16. Tredennick, 1960, 208-10, n.e..
17. H. Tredennick, Aristotle Prior Analytics. Cambridge: Harvard,
1938, 201.
18.Ross, 1949, 637ff.
1994, 226-7
·· ·-
19. Barnes,
20. Ross, 1949,
21. Ross, 1949,
22. Rist, 1989,
23. Ross, 1949,
641-2.
639.
83.
639; Barnes, 1994, 226
i
!
1
